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ΔημοΟιεύομεν κατωτέρω ανευ περικοπών τήν επιστολήν καί τό 
ιίρθρον τον κ. Θεοδώρου Α. Κονλουμπή, Καθηγητοϋ των 
Διεθνών Σχέσεων τοϋ 'Αμερικανικού Πανεπιστημίου vÿçWash­
ing ton, ώς είχομεν ύποσχεθή τούτο εις τό τεύχος άριθμ. 11-12 
('Ιανουάριου-Ιουνίου 1972, σελ. 3 τοϋ εξωφύλλου), σεβόμενοι 
καί τήν επιθυμίαν τοϋ συγγραφέως άλλα και τάς άρχάς τοϋ πε­
ριοδικού μας.
Ή πρόκλησις τοϋ κ. Κονλουμπή ουδόλως μάς ήνώχλησε, 
διότι υπήρξε σταθερά και συνεπής ή τακτική μας νά δημοσιεύω- 
μεν καί δυσμενείς διά τό σημερινόν καθεστώς τής χώρας μας 
απόψεις, όπως συνέβη τούτο καί με τό αρθρον τον κ. Jean Sio- 
tis υπό τίτλον «Some Notes on the Military in Greek Poli­
tics», rò όποιον εδημοσιεύθη εις τό τεϋχός μας 7-8 ('Ιανουά­
ριου-' Ιουνίου 1971, σελ. 29).
Τό πρόβλημα δμως, αν θά έπρεπε δηλαδή νά δημοσιευθονν 
τίι κείμενα τού κ. Κονλουμπή ή όχι, έδημιουργήθη κυρίως από 
τούς εξής δύο λόγους:
1) άπό τό ανεπιτυχές χιούμορ καί τους άήθεις χαρακτηρισμούς, 
πού περιέχονται εις τήν επιστολήν τον, καί
2) άπό τήν δημοσιογραφικήν δομήν τοϋ άρθρου τον, ή όποια 
ουδόλως άνταποκρίνεται είς τάς αναγκαίας προϋποθέσεις 
διά τήν δημοσίενσίν του είς επιστημονικήν Έπιθεώρησιν.
Παρά ταϋτα άπεφασίσαμεν νά δημοαιεύσωμεν άμφότερα τά 
κείμενα, έπαφιέμενοι τήν επ’ αυτών κρίσιν εις αύτούς τούτους 
τούς άναγνώστας καί στερούντες τον κ. Κονλουμπήν ετέρας ευ­
καιρίας εύκολου θριαμβολογίας!
Ό πρόλογος εις τον όποιον ό κ. Κουλονμπής άναφέρεται 
έχει ώς ακολούθως:
As we had promised in our issue No. 11-12 (January-June 
1972, page 3 of the cover), we are publishing as a whole the 
letter and the article of Mr. Theodore A. Couloumbis, As­
sociate Professor of International Relations of the Ameri­
can University, Washington, respecting not only the 
author’s wish but the principles of our journal as well.
Mr. Couloumbis’ challenge did not embarrass us at all, 
for it has been our consistent policy to publish also views 
unfavourable to the present regime of our country, as it 
was the case of Mr. Jean Siotis’ article «Some Notes on the 
Military in Greek Politics», published in issue No. 7-8 p. 29.
The problem, however, as to whether we had to publish 
Mr. Couloumbis' texts or not, originated mainly from the 
two following reasons:
1) the unsuccessful humour and the unusual terms con­
tained in his letter, and
2) the journalistic structure of his article which in no way 
meets the requirements for publication in a scientific 
review.
Nevertheless, we decided to have them both published, 
letting our readers judge them for themselves while de­
priving Mr. Couloumbis from a second opportunity of easy 
boasting!
The prologue referred to by Mr. Couloumbis is the fol­
lowing:
«...Un an presque après le Congrès de Varna (Con­
grès International de Sociologie,Bulgarie, 1970)une 
discussion politique sur la situation en Grèce a eu 
lieu à la Chambre des Représentants aux USA. A
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cette discussion ont pris part les professeurs de 
sciences politiques Μ. M. George Koussoulas et 
Théodore Kouloumbis,... nos lecteurs grecs en 
ont pris connaissance.
Cependant, il serait intéressant et instructif de 
rendre en public le contenu d’un entretien que j’ai 
eu avec le Professeur Th. Kouloumbis, qui depuis 
1966 rend régulièrement visite à notre Centre pen­
dant les vacances d’été, qu’il passe habituellement 
en Grèce. Si je me permets de porter à la connais­
sance de nos lecteurs cet entretien, c’est pour of­
frir l’occasion à M. Th. Kouloumbis de faire con­
naître à ses étudiants américains le point de vue 
des spécialistes des sciences sociales, qui vivent 
en Grèce et partagent les peines et les espoirs de 
leur peuple.
Au Professeur Th. Kouloumbis j’ai vivement re­
proché d’avoir déclaré devant la Commission de la 
Chambre des Représentants que l’Ambassadeur 
des USA devrait se mêler aux affaires intérieures 
de la Grèce, notamment en désaprouvant publi­
quement le Gouvernement actuel de notre pays. 
Le Professeur Th. Kouloumbis s’est excusé de sa 
déclaration et m’a avoué qu’il est mécontent d’a­
voir donné pareille réponse à l’insistante question 
d’un membre de la dite Commission. Néanmoins, 
quelques semaines après, le Professeur Th. Kou­
loumbis s’est présenté à nouveau devant cette 
Commission parlementaire des USA pour af­
firmer, en sa qualité de spécialiste des sciences po­
litiques, que lors de son dernier voyage en Grèce 
il n’a remarqué aucun progrès vers la liberalisation 
du régime. Pourtant, pendant notre entretien, 
M. Th. Kouloumbis avait avoué être favorable­
ment impressionné de constater en Grèce une 
pleine liberté de pensée en un respect des droits 
de l’individu. Entre autres, il avait remarqué en 
vitrine des librairies d’Athènes les récentes tra­
ductions en grec du Livre rouge de Mao, du 
Journal intime de Che Guevara, des écrits de H. 
Marcuse, etc.
Enfin de compte, pour le Professeur Th. Kou­
loumbis la seule critique à adresser au Gouverne­
ment grec concernerait son insistance à ne pas 
permettre encore le fonctionnement de partis poli­
tiques. Cependant, mon interlocuteur avait con­
venu que toute évolution de la vie politique en 
Grèce ne concerne que les Grecs qui vivent dans 
leur pays en non pas les parlementaires ou les 
intellectuels vivant dans les pays étrangers. Après 
celà, n’est-il pas très étonnant que, devant la 
Commission de la Chambre des Représentants des 
USA, M. Th. Kouloumbis ait pris une attitude 
tout à fait différente de celle que je viens de décri­
re? A M. Th. Kouloumbis lui-même il appartient 
de répondre à ma question...»
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 
WASHINGTON, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 20016 
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICE
June 16, 1972
Dear Mr. Dimitras:
This letter is in response to certain statements of yours 
contained in the prologue of the Revue de Recherches Socialse, 
No. 7-8, of January-June 1971 (published in 1972). In this pro­
logue you allege that what I told you in private conversations 
is not in harmony with my public statements before US Con­
gressional hearings.
Your «recollections» of our conversations are, I am afraid, 
for the most part either taken out of context or complete fig­
ments of a rather creative imagination. For example, I never 
told you in the summer of 1971 (or any time since 1967) that I 
had observed a situation of «freedom of thought and respect 
for the rights of the individual» in Greece. This is unthinkable 
and naive, while martial law is still in effect in parts of Greece, 
and while there is complete absence of the institutional trap­
pings of a democratic-competitive system (i.e. political parties, 
elections, parliamentary legislation, uncontrolled mass media 
and unpoliced institutional and associational activity). I am 
tempted, however, to agree with you that there is still freedom 
of thought in Greece, but there is definitely no freedom of 
expression. Thank God, our scientists have not yet invented 
effective instruments for the monitoring of thoughts.
Now let me turn to the subject of American intervention in 
the domestic affairs of Greece. I have studied this subject in 
some detail (see my Greek Political Reaction to American and 
NATO Influences, Yale Univ. Press, 1966), and my conclusion 
is that the US has played and is still playing a nearly pervasive 
role in the political affairs of Greece. As I have stated else­
where, «great inequality plus contact between two nations, 
spells intervention». Perhaps, in an ideal world Greece would 
be happiest as a totally sovereign and independent nation. The 
ideal is not the real world, however. In fact, the bulk of the liter­
ature today alleges that the present Greek regime is in large 
part the result of US intervention in Greek affairs! As for my 
own view, I would prefer no intervention at all from any ex­
ternal sources. If, on the other hand, politico-strategic impera­
tives render American intervention inevitable, then I would 
choose intervention favoring democracy rather than interven­
tion favoring dictatorship.
The next topic discussed in your prologue deals with my 
abservations on the «liberalization trends» in Greece. My 
oiews on this subject have been adequately expressed in the 
vfore-mentioned hearings. Let me quote:
(Quoted from «Greece, Spain and the Southern NATO Strat­
egy», Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. 
Washington, July-September 1972.)
July 12, 1971:
«Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think there is any chance that the 
present government will restore constitutional government 
under present policies?
Mr. COULOUMBIS. There is always a chance, sir.
Mr. HAMILTON. Is there a likelihood?
Mr. COULOUMBIS. Yes; there is a likelihood, but I think in 
the long-range future, in the very long-range future, which be­
comes irrelevant for those who are living in this decade.» (p. 13).
September 15, 1971:
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Between this last visit you made in July and 
August, and the previous time (April 1971), did you discern any 
steps, movements or political acts indicating the return to 
democratic principles?
173
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 07:06:11 |
ΈπιΟεώρησις Κοινωνικών ’Ερευνών δ' τρίμηνον 1972
Mr. COULOUMBIS. No. There was a change of government 
in Greece, and there were a number of new ministers—consid­
ered technocrats—introduced into the government, and there 
were, also, various administrative reshuffles. For example, a 
few ministries were fused together into larger ministries, but no 
steps, no announcements, and no implementation of important 
laws, such as the law on political parties, such as the formation 
of a constitutional court or Council of the Nation, none of 
these steps have taken place which would allow the ordinary ob­
server to discern the active preparation for political processes 
and for elections.
I did not discern any of this, nor was I told by any of my in­
terviewees, approximately forty of them, that they expected se­
rious developments toward the restoration of democracy, 
meaning elections, forthcoming (p. 402).
The present government has been in power for a number of 
years, and it has a number of individuals that it could rally 
around to form a political party also. So there is no question, 
should the opportunity be given, very quickly the people can 
organize their own political parties, their leaders, and seek the 
electoral mandate. But there appears to be no serious indica­
tion of this happening.
I am talking about a fact, not an intention. There are a lot of 
intentions.
The Prime Minister of Greece has repeatedly argued for the 
restoration of democracy from the very first speech as a prime 
minister to the present time. He has been constantly promising 
restoration. But political observers must judge a trend in terms 
of the objective steps rather than the goodwill or intentions of 
a given individual, and I am pessimistic rather than optimistic.» 
(p. 403).
I must point out sadly that the above observations which I 
made a year ago, are very much applicable today! There is 
nothing, incidentally, which would please me more than to be 
proven wrong regarding these pessimistic assessments on the 
chances of democratization in Greece.
Let me close this communication by saying that I consider 
my role as that of a political scientist, but also as that of a man. 
As a political scientist,I am interested—given my limitations and 
those of our discipline—in discovering and documenting ob­
jective conditions. Here, I have to be especially careful not to 
confuse my own hopes or preferences with the phenomena 
under observation. As a man, Γ have certain values and princi­
ples to which I wish to remain true. They involve, primarily, 
respect for democracy and freedom, and a belief that a society 
can realize its best in a free, competitive and well-governed 
system, where all the people freely choose their representatives.
Since our last conversation, I have made yet another work­
ing trip to Greece (April 19 to May 6, 1972). During my visit, 
I conducted approximately forty interviews with representati­
ves of the Greek political spectrum. The enclosed document 
is an essay containing and updating my impressions on con­
temporary Greece following this latest trip. My predictions 
regarding «liberalization» remain pessimistic still.
You are free to publish this essay, provided you publish it 
as a whole—rather than quoting out of context or selectively. 
The same should apply to my letter. I am hopeful that you will 
respect my wish, especially if you are interested in cultivating 
an image of a relatively detached director of an academic re­
search institution, rather than an image of a relatively skillful 
propagandist of a not so representative military regime.
Sincerely,
THEODORE A. COULOUMBIS 
Associate Professor of 
International Relations
’Επί τής ουσίας του άρθρου τού κ. Κουλουμπή, ή Έπιθεώ- 
ρησίς μας δέν ήθέλησε νά προβή εις Ιδικά της σχόλια. Έπρο- 
τιμήσαμε νά άναθέσωμε τήν κριτικήν τού άρθρου τούτου είς 
τόν έλληνικής καταγωγής ’Αμερικανόν καθηγητήν κ. James 
Brown, ό όποιος όμιλεϊ τήν έλληνικήν καί εχει μελετήσει 
επιστημονικός τήν έλληνικήν πολιτικήν ζωήν (βλ. καί άρ- 
θρον του «Political Performance within Polities: a Case Study 
of Greece, 1963-1967» είς Έπιθεώρησίν μας, τεύχος 11-12). 
Τά σχόλια τού κ. J. Brown δημοσιεύονται κατωτέρω μετά τό 
άρθρον τού κ. Θ. Κουλουμπή. Ό κ. J. Brown συνώδευσε τήν 
κριτικήν του μέ τήν άκόλουθον έπεξηγηματικήν έπιστολήν:
As far as the substance of Mr. Couloumbis’ article is con­
cerned, we did not wish to proceed on by having our own com­
ments published in our Review. We preferred, instead, to 
entrust the critique of this article to Prof. James Brown an 
American of Greek origin who speaks Greek and has studied 
accurately the Greek political life (see his article «Political 
Performance within Polities: a Case Study of Greece, 1963-1967» 
in our Review No. 11-12, as well). Mr. James Brown’s com­
ments are published here below after Mr. Th. Couloumbis’ 
article. His critique is accompanied by the following explana­
tory letter:
SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
December 12, 1972
Dr. Elias Dimitras, Director General 
National Centre of Social Research 
1 Rue Sophocleous 
Athens (122), GREECE
Dear Dr. Dimitras:
I just received your telegram and I apologize for not having 
put my critique of Professor Couloumbis’ article in the mail 
sooner. I hope that I have not affected the Journal’s publica­
tion date.
My critique primarily concentrates on Couloumbis unwil­
lingness to consider the underlying problems of Greek poli­
tical and social institutions that ultimately led to April, 1967. 
I think that this is essential for one to understand Greek po­
litics. Furthermore, it is always very easy to fault a govern­
ment or a person for what he hasn’t done or is doing... this 
is the crux of his article. My intent is to present the substantive 
issues.
Thank you very much for this opportunity to contribute to 
your publication.
Sincerely yours,
JAMES BROWN 
Assistant Professor
THE ARTICLE OF TH. COULOUMBIS
the regime
My latest trip to Greece coincided with festivities 
in commemoration of the 5th anniversary of the «Re­
volution», as the Greek military regime likes to call
174
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the outcome of its military coup of April 21, 1967. As 
I walked around the busy downtown streets of Athens, 
I immediately noticed large wall posters abundantly 
exhibited on trees, telephone poles, kiosks, and walls 
of buildings. The most prominent aspect of these 
posters was the digit «5». Closer examination indi­
cated that the «5» stood for «Five golden years of the 
Revolution, Five golden pages». It had a definite psy­
chological effect on the viewer. Five years means per­
manence. Five years means a small lifetime. Five 
years means the death or abandonment of many a 
finite dream.
Soon I discovered, however, that hundreds of these 
posters plastered on main thoroughfares, such as 
Stadiou, Panepistimiou, and Academias Streets, were 
clustered provocatively under legible signs carved on 
the walls proclaiming starkly: «The affixing of wall 
posters is strictly prohibited by law».
I muttered to myself: «What kind of a 'law and 
order’ regime is this that breaks so blatantly its own 
laws?». I asked the same question later of some of the 
regime’s officials. The response was puzzling: «Well, 
you see, Mr. Professor, these are the deeds of the 
extreme rightists in our group. The lunatic fringe, so 
to speak. They like to rub it in. They want the Greek 
people to become conscious of the fact that five years 
means business. But, of course, these people are not 
representative of the main thrust of our regime».
What is, then, the main thrust of the Papadopoulos 
regime five years later? What are its objectives and 
what are its practices and norms today? Very much as 
in the case of the «forbidden poster», there seem to 
coexist in Greece today two systems: a formal system 
and an operative system.
The formal system is represented by the Consti­
tution of September 1968. It is the law of the military 
regime. It is a constitution approved by close to 92% 
of the Greek people voting in a referendum, but under 
the pressure of martial law. The Constitution provides 
for a parliamentary system, with a strong executive, a 
military establishment independent from civilian 
control, and aweakened—verging on the ceremonial— 
king. The Constitution also provides for the pro­
tection of civil rights and liberties, a multi-party sys­
tem, a free press, and other standard characteristics 
of Western-style democracies. This, then, is the for­
mal system, and Greek officials point to this con­
stitution when they are asked to spell out their visions 
for Greece.
The operative system, however, is another story. 
Relying on Article 138 of the 1968 Constitution, which 
«permits» the regime to apply the whole charter grad­
ually and incrementally, the regime has kept impor­
tant portions of the Constitution (providing for some 
democracy) on ice. So there is no parliament in 
Greece today. Instead, there exists a «mini-parlia­
ment», known as the advisory committee, which is 
co-opted by a hand-picked group of «electors». Even 
this non-representative body has no more than advi­
sory and consultative powers on legislation. Further, 
there are no political parties permitted to function 
and no elections. Instead, the three organized insti­
tutions, through which political participation—and 
hence power—is exercized, are the armed forces, the 
bureaucracy, and the church hierarchy. The two ma­
jor informal institutions of support are the big busi­
ness groups (local and foreign) and the Great Power 
ally, the United States. Martial law—or its «shadow», 
as Papadopoulos likes to refer to it—is still in effect 
in the major urban centers, while rural Greece is care­
fully controlled by appointed (rather than elected) lo­
cal officials, carefully buttressed by the reinforced 
formal and informal security apparatus. The King, 
ever since his ill-fated counter-coup of December 13, 
1967, has been residing in a small villa in Rome, still 
formally the head of the Greek state, still reimbursed 
for his services, his portraits and those of Queen 
Anna Maria together with that of Georgios Papado­
poulos still adorning official rooms. But the opera­
tive functions of the King are now in the hands of 
Georgios Papadopoulos, who assumed the Regency 
from ousted General Georgios Zoitakis early in 1972. 
Papadopoulos, as if trying to prove to his other mi­
nisters that they are underworked, is now serving as 
Regent, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Minister of Defense, and Minister of Government 
Policy.
The trend, if any, in Greece these days appears to 
favor the longer range perpetuation of the operative 
system, rather than the full application of the 1968 
Constitution. Tn fact, Greece reverberates with ru­
mors, every so often, regarding the possible inten­
tions of the «Revolution» (i.e., Papadopoulos). Will 
he proclaim Greece a republic minus king and assu­
me the presidency himself? Or will he put the question 
of Republic or Monarchy before a popular referen­
dum? Will he force the King to abdicate in favor of 
young Prince Paul (aged 5), thus trying to play the 
lead in a Francoesque scenario? Or will he ask the 
King to return to Greece and formalize with his pres­
ence the gradual application of the 1968 Constitu­
tion? Or, finally, will he merely continue protracting 
his present «indecision», once more proving the old 
French maxim that there is nothing more permanent 
than the temporary? Most knowledgeable people-— 
regardless of political persuasion—seem to argue that 
Papadopoulos will opt for the last among these alter­
natives, i.e., «protracted indeterminacy». This ap­
pears to be in keeping with Papadopoulos’ style, so 
far, of a cautious incrementalist, who enjoys playing 
the balancing game, who avoids taking great risks, 
who likes to have multiple options, and who—above
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all—realizes that his present strategy has netted him 
five years of uninterrupted power.
But protracted indeterminacy is not, necessarily, 
a condition free of peril for the fortunes of Georgios 
Papadopoulos. As a «friendly opponent» of his regi­
me told me, the problem with indeterminacy is that 
«Greece has been pregnant for five years, but no child 
is being born. Greeks have been promised a 'revolu­
tionary5 birth or rebirth, and—on occasion—the 
mother cries out with rhythmic agony...but in the end 
it all proves a false alarm and the people go back to 
awaiting the next set of pains». It is in outlooks such 
as these that one begins to identify three emerging 
trends within the not-so-revolutionary womb of the 
Greek regime.
The first group is the «parenthesis closers». They 
are most vocally represented by retired Colonel Di- 
mitrios Stamatelopoulos, who resigned in protest 
from the regime’s revolutionary council and assumed 
a publicly critical stance by providing frequent signed 
articles for the Athens conservative opposition daily, 
Vradyni. Stamatelopoulos begins with the premise 
that the 1967 military intervention was absolutely nec­
essary to save the country from anarchism, chaos, 
corruption, and a possible leftist takeover. However, 
he feels that the Army’s role should have been limited 
to acting as a «parenthesis» in Greek politics, to re­
store a new order (the 1968 Constitution) and to 
quickly return to strictly military functions, leaving 
politics to the civilians (or retired and resigned mili­
tary) and to the electoral process. What Stamatelo­
poulos and like-thinking men seem to fear is that the 
parenthesis is beginning to assume proportions of a 
chapter, if not a volume, of modern Greek history. 
Further, they fear that the collective nature of the 
«revolution» is gradually giving way to the projection 
of the «cult of the individual»—Georgios Papadopou­
los. Finally, they worry that the politicization of the 
armed forces and their functional diversification is 
likely to weaken their primary function: external de­
fense.
The second group, «the dictatorship backers», are 
open advocates for an unadulterated, traditional, and 
publicly proclaimed dictatorship of the Right. 
Longing for the days of the Metaxas authoritarian re­
gime (1936-40), they argue that today’s regime should 
drop its democratic pretensions, proclaim a firm but 
paternalistic dictatorship, and purge all «leftist sus­
pects» from the ranks of the «revolution». A man 
quite often mentioned in connection with these atti­
tudes is retired Colonel Ioannis Ladas, currently 
serving as the regime’s Deputy Minister in charge of 
the local affairs of Central Greece.
The third group is the «revolutionaries». They 
claim that 20th century Greece has been ripe for a 
revolution, suffering from inequality, backwardness,
and masked oppression in the hands of a narrow 
caste or elite known as the «Kolonakiotes» (a wealthy 
or high-status set living at the fashionable Athens 
quarter of Kolonaki). Greece, according to this view, 
needed a revolution to rid itself of this wretched poli­
tical, economic, and social «katestimeno» (as «estab­
lishment» is referred to). In the post-World War II 
period there were only two movements, according to 
the «revolutionaries», from which genuine revolution 
could credibly originate. The first were the Commu­
nists (who were supplemented in the 1960s by the 
Andreas Papandreou forces), and the second were the 
«middle-range» officers in the armed forces. Where 
the first group failed, the second (the middle-range 
officers) succeeded. Being recruited from the lower 
and middle ranks of the Greek people, these officers 
(the argument goes) are aware from personal expe­
rience of ordinary people’s pains and passions.
The «Revolution of April 21, 1967», according to 
this third point of view, has remained «incomplete» 
to date. It has dealt a blow only to Greece’s political 
establishment, while the economic and social estab­
lishments still remain intact. If a new, «post-revolu­
tionary» Greece is going to emerge, it has to be both 
nationalist, in the tradition of Ion Dragoumis, and 
socialist, in the tradition of Alexandros Papanasta- 
siou. It has to work for the equitable redistribution 
of income, the supply of ample social services for all 
people, and the restoration of Greece to its national 
dignity—free of foreign corrosive interventions which 
have plagued the modern Greek nation since its 19th 
century genesis. These views are publicly propounded 
in the writings and speeches of the «theoreticians of 
the Revolution», men such as Demetrios Tsakonas, 
Georgios Georgalas, and Vassilis Frangos. These 
attitudes and directions, if taken seriously, would 
prove especially attractive among the younger of 
Greece’s officer corps, who are, kiddingly, referred 
to as «Kadafides» (after Lybia’s young military 
strong man, Qadhafi).
There is a fourth group which one could call the 
«bureaucrats» or «technocrats» or «managers». Men 
such as these are found in all regimes, and they pro­
vide the ballast which presumably keeps the ship of 
state afloat regardless of the strength of the political 
winds. Since the «technocrats» are likely to serve with 
equal enthusiasm any of the above groups, we will not 
dwell on them any further.
In the meantime, one can safely say that all three 
categories above prefer the present indeterminacy to 
a return to the pre-coup 1967 system, which, for them, 
might raise the specter of severe punishment, up to 
and including physical liquidation. So, if they cannot 
realize the «ideal worlds», their next best bets are to 
stick with the status quo. Interestingly, all three of the 
above groups believe and argue that Georgios Papa-
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dopoulos is explicitly or implicitly in harmony with 
their special views, being «forced» only to make the 
necessary compromises in the «short run» in order to 
accommodate for the disparate groups which have 
placed themselves under the flag of the April 21st 
«Revolution».
Papadopoulos and his closest lieutenants, in their 
most recent speeches and statements, appear to be 
moving subtly but steadily away from the «parenthe­
sis closers». On April 21, before Greece’s rapidly in­
creasing television audience, Papadopoulos read a 
statement which avoided any reference to democracy 
and/or the full application of the 1968 Constitution, 
elections, or such similar utterances. He said, on the 
contrary, that Greece is governed today in the style 
required by her national needs. Beyond this, he added, 
there exists no absolute model for the uniform gov­
ernance of all peoples. Politics are to be developed 
for each country in accordance with the unique ex­
periences and needs of each country. (This all rings 
to me as a vague mirror-image echo of Marshal Tito’s 
protestations in 1948 for a «Yugoslav Road to Com­
munism».)
First Deputy Premier Stylianos Pattakos has also 
been asserting publicly that elections in Greece are 
farther away than ever because «the people do not 
want them», being fed up with elections and old poli­
tics. The regime’s official spokesman, Byron Stama- 
topoulos, even went as far as to assert, during a recent 
speech in Macedonia, that the governmental «baton 
of authority» will be passed on directly to the Greek 
youth from today’s regime. Some of the skeptics quip­
ped that Stamatopoulos would have been better ad­
vised to use «whip» rather than «baton».
the political forces
So far, we have been talking as if Papadopoulos and 
his regime existed in a vacuum. Is there no reaction 
to their plans and policies? What is the role of the 
Greek political forces, both at home and in exile? 
What about the students, the workers, and the people 
in general?
Prior to the 1967 coup, there operated in Greece 
three major political parties and two minor ones. The 
major parties, from Right to Left, were ERE (Natio­
nal Radical Union), EK (Center Union), and EDA 
(Unified Democratic Left). The two splinter parties 
were Spyros Markezinis’ Progressives (commanding 
between 2 and 5% of the'popular vote), and a centrifu­
gal group which spun off the Center Union in 1965, 
called ΦΔΚ (Liberal Democratic Party).
It was as a result of a serious crisis, between the for­
ces of ERE plusKingConstantine on one side facing the 
forces of the Center Union on the other, that the pre­
sent rulers cultivated the proper climate for their take­
over. Today, the preponderance of Greece’s politicians, 
with some exceptions to be mentioned below, are uni­
fied in an «intellectual front», if not an organizational 
one. There is a coordinated political leadership under 
the aegis of Panayotis Kanellopoulos (ERE)—-the 
last pre-coup prime minister of Greece—joined by 
Georgios Mavros and Ioannis Zigdis for the EK, and 
Demetrios Papaspyrou, the last President of the 
Greek Parliament for ΦΔΚ. They issue periodically 
declarations or announcements to local and foreign 
press representing as many as 167 Greek parlia­
mentarians. These declarations decry the dictator­
ship in Greece, the absence of civil rights and free­
doms, the progressive cultural and economic isola­
tion of Greece from Western Europe, and, generally, 
the social and cultural backwardness which the Greek 
dictatorship perpetuates—thus generating the nucle­
us of a revolutionary situation which might, eventual­
ly, plunge the country into tragic bloodshed through 
guerrilla conflict.
They point their collective finger at the United Sta­
tes for insistently aiding and abetting this oppressive 
regime, thus alienating Greeks—a traditionally pro- 
American population—and cultivating sure-fire anti- 
Americanism.
This unified set of political forces is opposed to 
dynamic and bloody resistance, for they fear the kind 
of scenario which lias managed to ravage Vietnam so 
totally. For them, the solution has to be «politicai». 
And the United States—which, according to them, 
still maintains central influence over the Greek estab­
lishment—must play a key role in the process toward 
the restoration of democracy. Specifically, the US 
has to demonstrate unequivocally (either through 
NATO or unilaterally), byword as well as action, that 
it is in favor of the restoration of democracy in 
Greece.
The minimum which these unified political forces 
appear to be willing to accept is the return of a genuine 
electoral process, albeit under the 1968 Constitution. 
Acceptance or rejection of the 1968 Constitution 
(which they do not like) is not a major issue for them. 
What is vital, however, is that contingent elections 
provide a genuine opportunity (e.g., free press and 
access to radio and television) for the political forces 
to compete for the vote of the Greek people.
The implicit recognition of the 1968 Constitution 
is a major concession on the part of the political 
world, so far as I can judge the situation. By accepting 
the 1968 Constitution, through their willingness to 
participate in elections, the unified political forces are 
legitimizing the dictatorial parenthesis since 1967. The 
evidence, therefore, of a major «compromise offer» on 
the part of the politicians is now unquestionable. The 
specific details of «transition» toward democracy 
vary, and alternative proposals are numerous. But
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the following basic ingredients of compromise are 
evident throughout:
(1) The US must press the Greek armed establish­
ment (and the regime) to apply—in full and by a date 
certain—its 1968 Constitution, thus leading to elec­
tions.
(2) The regime must give way to an «interim govern­
ment» (of generals, or of nonpolitical personalities, 
or a regime headed by a nationally known political fi­
gure, such as Konstantinos Karamanlis) which will- 
under emergency powers—prepare the country for 
elections. That is, it will provide an orderly period of 
about eight months to a year, so that political machi­
nery (parties, coordination, candidates, electoral 
laws) may be established.
(3) The present rulers will be free to return to private 
life, or to set up their own political party and solicit 
the vote of the Greek people.
Naturally, there is something «non-optimal» about 
this sequence of transition. A prominent and re­
spected political figure told me, while shaking his head 
quite sadly, that, although he would not fight against 
the above «compromise», he would be forced to retire 
from such politics. He told me:
You see, I consider myself more as a national pedagogue and 
less as a politician.And I fear that this «compromise» legitimizes 
ex post facto the use of force and the illegal seizure of power 
by the junta in 1967. There is such a thing, you know, as social 
learning. And I fear that our young men and women will be 
taught by all this that successfully applied violence pays. Ideal­
ly, the junta should have been made a bad example by proper 
punishment. But, we do not have the power to do it. And to 
lead the country to revolution and bloodshed is to raise the 
price of meting out political justice to socially prohibitive 
levels.
The dilemma is unquestionably profound! But it 
appears that, in an imperfect world, the politicians in 
Greece are ready to settle for the «lesser evil», since 
the price of attaining the «absolute good» is civil war, 
a situation where the means outweigh in cost the value 
of the desired—but not necessarily achievable—end.
The politicians of the Greek Left (whose regular 
following in the postwar period has hovered around 
15% of the popular vote) are not included organiza­
tionally in the unified movement discussed above. 
Their views, however, appear to be quite similar, if not 
identical, with the rest of the spectrum. The Left, to­
day, is a skeptical, frustrated, disillusioned, and phi­
losophically resigned group. They understand, now, 
that, in the imperatives of the geostrategic game, 
Greece has to be a «satellite» of the US, as much as 
Czechoslovakia has to be a Soviet «satellite». They 
feel, therefore, the Left’s role in Greece must be in 
the future a «bourgeoisified» role, much in the style 
of the French, Italian, or Cypriot Communist parties.
The Left in Greece will not have credible recourse to 
«dynamic means» (which have proven tragically 
counterproductive in the post-World War II era). 
Instead, it must restrict itself to the role of a «minori­
ty political opposition» which can never safely expect 
to come to power as long as the present Soviet-Ame- 
rican strategic balance in the Mediterranean remains 
essentially unchanged.
Two political personalities, Spyros Markezinis 
(Progressives) and Evangelos Averoff (ERE), have 
assigned themselves the separate status of «bridge 
builders». Their attitudes, summarized, involve an 
acceptance of the «fact» that the regime is in power 
and that it cannot be removed. On the other hand, 
although the regime knows how to hold power, it does 
not know what to do with it. Therefore, the colonels 
must be «convinced» to gradually return power back 
to the civilians, who know what to do with it and who 
will return the country to the democratic system of 
government. Their bridge-building efforts so far have 
accommodated precious little in traffic.
This leads us to the next group of politicians, nick­
named «ephapsies», which could be loosely translated 
as the «Ivy League». These are approximately 20 
parliamentary deputies of EK and ERE who had 
agreed to hold publicized meetings with Georgios 
Papadopoulos at his request. They are referred to as 
the «Ivy Leaguers» because, like ivy, they want to 
cling to strong supports wherever and whenever these 
can be found. The attitude of the Ivy Leaguers is sum­
marized by the cynics as «if you can’t lick ’em, join 
’em». These ex-parliamentarians, however, explain 
their actions quite differently. Having lost respect for 
the bulk of the Greek politicians, and fearing that the 
present impasse can extend itself indefinitely, they 
argue that, by negotiating with Papadopoulos—and 
even, if necessary, working with him—they will be 
gradually paving the way for the legitimization proc­
ess which might eventually lead to genuine and partic­
ipatory democracy.
One final group must be referred to before we- 
abandon the domestic political arena. This is a cluster 
of upper middle class intellectuals and professionals, 
with no previous parliamentary experience. They 
have banded around an organization entitled «Asso­
ciation for the Study of Greek Problems». The head 
of this organization, Ioannis Pezmatzoglou (ex-Depu- 
ty Director of the Bank of Greece and ex-Professor 
of Political Economy at the University of Athens), 
was recently arrested and displaced to a smal 
village for allegedly arousing political passions 
and undermining the sense of security of the Greek 
people. The concept of the Pezmatzoglou Association, 
which is currently being threatened with dissolution, 
is to provide Greece with a «counter-establishment» 
to Papadopoulos’ establishment, and not to allow the
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forces which see Greece as a Western, democratic, 
and European-oriented nation to wither away.
Realizing that the old political forces had misman­
aged affairs prior to the coup, and even more con­
cerned with the rapid deterioration of affairs since 
1967, this group feels that it could act as a nucleus and 
as an incubation chamber for the development of new 
political forces in Greece. Some of its members or 
supporters have experienced either jail or persecution 
and displacement at the hands of the Greek regime. 
The Association’s activities have centered around the 
encouragement of critical, but nonviolent, expressions 
vis-à-vis the regime, including the sponsorship of 
books, articles, speeches, and conferences drama­
tizing the contemporary plight of the country.
the exiles
Outside Greece, mainly in Western Europe, but 
also in Canada, the US, Eastern Europe, and the 
USSR, one finds exiled and self-exiled Greeks rep­
resenting the full spectrum discussed above.
The most prominent among them is Konstantinos 
Karamanlis. Aged now sixty-five, having served as 
Prime Minister of Greece 1956-63, he left the Greek 
political scene in November 1963 after suffering a nar­
row political defeat in the elections of that month. He 
has been living in Paris ever since, decrying both past 
and present in the Greek political system. Quite re­
cently, his views have been carefully articulated in a 
political biography authored by France’s octogena­
rian academician, Maurice Genevoix (Jokingly, so­
me Athenian pundits refer to him as «Je ne vois pas»).
Karamanlis, in my opinion, fits best the role of the 
«bridge» between the regime and some form of de­
mocracy, because he combines the following impor­
tant characteristics:
(1) He is experienced in politics (eight years as pre­
mier).
(2) He has been absent from the Greek political scene 
during the critical years of 1965-67, which provided 
the excuse and the opportunity for the military take­
over.
(3) The Greek politicians of all colorations seem to 
accept him as a unifying and compromising factor.
(4) The Greek people appear to trust in his funda­
mentally democratic orientation and his ability to 
exercise vigorous and hard-headed leadership.
(5) Being a conservative (ERE), his non-Communist 
and anti-Communist credentials are «in order», which 
probably means that he would be acceptable to the 
US military-industrial complex-oriented foreign poli­
cy vis-à-vis Greece.
(6) Above all else, Karamanlis seems to offer one 
extra ingredient compared to all other politicians 
either in Greece or abroad: he projects the image of a
leader who enjoys the «trust» of active-duty officers 
today, perhaps even up to and including members of 
the Greek regime, that he will not take «revenge» 
against them, if and when he comes to power.
Despite his relative anonymity outside Greece, and 
his sparse public announcements (two public state­
ments since 1967 condemning the perpetuation of 
dictatorship), Karamanlis remains a very usable ex­
ile, and one quite likely to play an important role in 
the near future. Inside Greece, the Genevoix biogra­
phy has been selling widely, meanwhile, and hundreds 
of copies are prominently displayed in many book­
stores.
The most vocal Greek exile leader is Andreas Pa­
pandreou. Currently a professor of economics at 
York University in Toronto, Papandreou is grinding 
out books, giving speeches throughout the world, at­
tending rallies and testimonials, and generally seeking 
to generate a resistance movement against the Papa­
dopoulos regime. Papandreou has formed a resis­
tance organization entitled PAK (Panhellenic Libe­
ration Movement), and has argued for the need for 
active and violent resistance against what he considers 
to be a neo-fascist, puppet regime, imposed upon the 
Greeks by US Pentagon and CIA circles—who are, in 
essence, the true occupiers of Greece. The US needs 
a puppet regime in Greece, according to Andreas Pa­
pandreou, in order to maintain bases, facilities, ac­
cess, and overflight rights there, and in order to use 
Greece as a rest and recreation area for US Sixth 
Fleet crews and their families—unwelcome elsewhere 
in the Mediterranean. Papandreou declares that post­
junta Greece should become a neutralist nation, with 
strong social-democratic or socialist-democratic ten- 
decies and without a king.
Papandreou’s critics, in turn, accuse him of fol­
lowing an unrealistic policy, which way be theoretical­
ly desirable, but which is politically (i.e., tactically) 
unfeasible. By lashing out simultaneously at both the 
US and the USSR and by arguing for a Greece out­
side of NATO and for a «Europe to the Europeans», 
he is creating powerful antagonistic poles against his 
program and aspirations. By insisting on specific and 
ideologically puristic sets of policies, he is alienating 
many short-range allies who might have been invalua­
ble in the process of enlarging the wave of opposition 
against the Papadopoulos regime. So, his critics 
argue, Papandreou is left with precious little in tangi­
ble support from the outside world (whatever third 
world revolutionary movements can offer him), while, 
internally, the most likely group to heed his «call to 
action» is the young «kataf ides», rather than the «pas­
sive resistance» oriented general public.
Of course, Papandreou can respond to all this by 
branding it as defeatist talk, and by saying that there 
is no stopping for an idea whose time has come, and
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that violent resistance is not the act of the many but 
the select few among those dedicated to a set of ideals.
The most speculative and philosophically oriented 
of the current exiles is the well known musician and 
leftist politician, Mikis Theodorakis, who is based in 
Paris. Theodorakis has recently resigned his member­
ship in the Greek Communist party, thus exhibiting 
his disillusionment with bureaucratic state-capitalism 
of the Soviet type. Being still in a revolutionary mood, 
he feels that the Greeks should take time and take 
stock before making important moves. The time, now, 
in his opinion, does not appear ripe for violent re­
sistance. From his statements, one can infer only that 
Theodorakis would counsel for political or subversive 
rather than open military means. In a recent trial in 
Athens,Theodorakis was found innocent of a pre-coup 
charge and, possibly, the road has been opened for 
his possible return to Greece—a matter of some spec­
ulation for Greece’s observers.
The highest ranking exile is 32-year-old King 
Constantine. He lives in Rome, technically the head 
of state, but discharging few—if any-—formal duties. 
Constantine has been silent on Greek affairs, for the 
most part. He has only once—and informally—set 
conditions for his return: i.e., the release of political 
prisoners, the lifting of martial law, and recourse to 
free and genuine elections. Otherwise, he has used 
much of his four-and-a-half-year exile to continue 
his studies at Cambridge, to read as widely as pos­
sible, and to participate in athletic events.
Constantine’s options today are limited. He may 
find himself back in Greece, if the «political transi­
tion» formula, favored by most politicians, is adopted. 
This is even more likely to occur should the US adopt 
it as its genuine and official policy. Constantine will 
probably also return to Greece should Papadopou­
los invite him to do so. But Papadopoulos, so far, has 
preferred the status quo vis-à-vis the King to any 
step of ousting him or inviting him back (the low-risk, 
high-balance policy). In any case, one can safely as­
sume that, should the King return, under any alter­
native, his role will be limited to ceremonial rather 
than substantive power.
The most recent exile is Professor of Constitu­
tional Law Georgios Mangakis, whose peculiar exit 
from Greece (mid-April 1972) via the US military 
base at the Athens airport and in the presence of the 
German Ambassador to Greece, Peter Limbourg, 
caused the ambassador to be named personna non 
grata and to be recalled by Germany. Mangakis had 
been released for health reasons from prison, where he 
had been serving an 18- yearsentence for allegedly part­
icipating in bombing plots. Mangakis is closer to the 
Pezmatzoglou-type forces, and his style and actions 
are hard to predict at this early stage. He has been 
offered a teaching position at Heidelberg University.
Interestingly enough, the removal from Greece of 
important personalities—who happen to have inter­
national reputations and connections-—such as An­
dreas Papandreou, Mikis Theodorakis, Eleni Ylachou 
(the prominent conservative publisher), and, most 
recently, Professor Mangakis, is creating some nega­
tive effects within the ranks of the opposition. There 
is a natural tendency for the rank and file to become 
concerned with «elitism» and «special treatment» of 
any sort. This, in turn, reinforces the attitude that, 
eventually, those who will be most respected and 
valued will be those who stay in Greece to «face the 
music»—the persecution, jail, and psychological and 
even physical torture. ((Privileged prisoners» and 
«privileged revolutionaries» are contradictions in 
terms. For this point of view, I would like to add that 
these critics do not realize the extent of psychologi­
cal privation, despair, and mental torture that life in 
exile can be. Suffering is geographically indiscrimi­
nate, and only its styles and forms change.
Finally, the Communist exiles are currently in the 
midst of a deep crisis of unity. Their forces have been 
fragmented and have been, at least, trichotomized 
into pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese (internationalist-revo­
lutionary), and nationalist bourgeoisified factions. 
It is ironic that the Greek rightist regime took over 
power and justified, initially, its takeover as a re­
sponse to a serious Communist threat. This came at 
a time when the Communist forces in Greece had been 
experiencing a progressive decline as a result of in­
ternal fragmentation, bourgeoisification, and the 
reflection of wider schisms in the international Com­
munist movement.
Summing up on exiles, one can say that they are 
not a force to be easily dismissed in the years to come. 
If nothing else, they offer the Greeks a psychological 
feeling—even if it is at times magnified or under­
rated—that they are ceaselessly working overseas 
for the restoration of democratic freedoms in the 
fatherland.
Large numbers of immigrants, especially the 
estimated 300,000 Greek guest workers in Germany, 
provide a long-range revolutionary potential of im­
ponderable dimensions·—assuming that the restora­
tion of democracy does not occur in the foreseeable 
future.
Greece is a country heavily dependent on Western 
tourism and trade. Democratic ideals, like tourists, 
will continue flowing into Greece. One thing, then, 
appears certain: that the Greeks will not easily forget 
or grow unaccustomed to the democratic way of life.
the foreign factor
Greece, from the beginning of its modern history, 
has experienced constant intervention of great and
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even medium-range powers in her internal affairs. 
The post-World War II period has been no exception. 
The United States succeeded Britain in 1947—through 
the Truman Doctrine—in the role of the ((protector» 
of Greece and Turkey, following Britain’s abdication 
from the area and the beginning of her gradual retreat 
from empire. Greece, through the October 1944 per­
centages agreement (between Churchill and Stalin), 
had been relegated to the British and, by succession, 
to the American sphere of influence. The Soviets ap­
pear to have respected the terms of this deal, to date, 
with religious exactness. This is a lesson that the 
Greek Communists have not learned easily. In their 
attempt to take power in Greece through the use of 
force, they met with the solid hostility of the West and 
the «benign neglect» of the Soviets. They fought 
against the tide of strategic imperatives, and they pre­
dictably lost. Today, Andreas Papandreou is asking 
his supporters to play a similar role (in the sense of 
fighting against Western military imperatives). The 
cards appear to be stacked against him, and the odds 
are truly slim.
The US since 1947, has played an extremely im­
portant role in Greece. US influence has been mani­
fested through economic and military aid, amounting 
to well over four billion dollars since 1947, through 
close bilateral and NATO military cooperation 
(including the training of close to 11,000 Greek of­
ficers in the US), and through economic and cultural 
penetration by means of sizable trade, investment, 
and various cultural exchange programs. As a result, 
the Greek political culture asserts that nothing im­
portant can happen in Greece unless the US approves 
it. It is a logical deduction, therefore, for them to as­
sume that the US engineered the 1967 coup and has 
been supporting the Papadopoulos regime ever since.
US policy, since 1967, has been officially stated as 
one of «dilemma», balancing political disappointment 
against strategic necessity. The substance of the poli­
cy, however, appears quite different from its letter. 
US military aid and support through loans and grants 
has reversed the downward trend of the mid-1960s, 
and since the 1967 coup it has been increasing steadi­
ly. It has been only as a result of intense congressional 
pressure that the Nixon Administration was forced 
to level off its military assistance to Greece for fiscal 
year 1972, rather than increase it in accordance with 
budgetary requests.
The operative policy of the US, as opposed to its 
formal policy, would be more than satisfied if Geor- 
gios Papadopoulos were to employ a democratic fig 
leaf, thus giving his regime some inauthentic trappings 
of a representative system, while camouflaging cer­
tain authoritarian unpleasantries. Papadopoulos, 
however, has not even offered a surface appearance 
of liberalization. If anything, the «trend toward con­
stitutionalism» which US officials had been predicting 
in the middle of 1970 has either atrophied or, more 
likely, been reversed.
US policy toward Greece in the 1970s appears, 
then, to fall into an anachronistic, cold-war pattern. 
US policy-makers seem to be more at ease dealing 
with a military-backed—albeit unpopular—regime 
than facing the necessary «inconveniences» which 
might result from a political government, answerable 
to its own people, in a free and open society. The US 
is opting to protect its short-term military interests 
at the expense of alienating nearly the gamut of the 
political forces of Greece. Thus it is further nour­
ishing a reputation of siding with dictators rather 
than popular forces, as a matter of cold-war reflex. 
Needless to say, this policy is unwise and imprudent, 
as it has proven repeatedly in the past quite bank­
rupt—the more so because it has shed even the last 
few vestiges of morality.
the Greek people
Greece, in spite of its political system, today is a 
good society. Its people are overwhelmingly cohesive 
in all aspects of culture, and the country has been en­
joying one of the lowest social crime rates on earth. 
The latter has been a traditional situation in Greece 
and is unrelated to the «law and order» regime since 
1967.
The Greeks have had a traditional tendency toward 
underestimating their political leadership. This is pri­
marily the result of judging their leaders absolutely 
rather than relatively—a tendency, that is, not to com­
pare the Greek experience agains that of other nations 
in similar socio-economic status. When one, however, 
proceeds with such comparisons, the post-World War 
II parliamentary governments in Greece, from 1950 
to 1967, begin to look very good. GDP (Gross Do­
mestic Product) growth rates increased an average of 
6%yearly in the 1950s, and these growth rates reached 
an average of 8% in the early and middle 1960s. This 
earned for Greece the fourth largest growth rate 
among non-Communist nations in the whole world—- 
a rate which, incidentally, compares quite favorably 
with the experience of similar socio-economic status 
countries such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Turkey, 
and Egypt.
The record in other sectors of growth has, also, 
been quite satisfactory. For instance, numbers of 
schools and enrollments in primary and secondary 
education had been steadily increasing (reaching ex­
ponential levels in the 1965-67 period). The number of 
political parties had been decreasing (down to three 
major parties in 1967 from over 40 in 1950), a stand­
ard indicator of political development. And illiteracy 
has been combatted in a country where newspapers
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are the chief opinion-making medium, compared to 
the remaining mass media.
The main problems facing Greece prior to the April 
1967 coup were an inadequate and inequitable income 
distribution profile, a backward system of higher edu­
cation, a bureaucracy that was relatively inefficient 
and tradition-bound, and a political system which was 
in need of drastic streamlining. Since the coup, the 
income distribution picture has not changed drasti­
cally (if anything, the gap between the very rich and 
the very poor has widened), and the situation in higher 
education has gone from bad to worse—since the pro­
blem of dictatorial control of university studies has 
been added upon numerous (unsolved) traditional 
problems (such as atrocious student-to-professor 
ratios, non-participation of students in the gover­
nance of the universities, and a virtual absence of 
post-graduate education). An attempt to decentralize 
the bureaucracy, beginning with August 1971, has not 
apparently brought about the desired effects in terms 
of efficiency and citizen satisfaction. And, finally, the 
situation in politics has retrogressed drastically with 
the elimination of democratic-competitive political 
activity (and attendant citizen participation) in the 
country.
The two hydrocephalic centers of Greece are found 
in the Athens-Piraeus and the Thessaloniki urban 
complexes. One witnesses there, and to a lesser extent 
in rural Greece, the inevitable pattern of moderniza­
tion qua industrialization: the air of Athens, for 
example, is now badly polluted by the exhaust fumes 
of over 200,000 chain-smoking motor vehicles of all 
kinds, ably aided by air-jet emissions and numerous 
industrial belt polluters.The traffic jams of downtown 
Athens seek to rival those of New York City. The 
supermarket (called «self service» in Greece) is stea­
dily displacing the personalized service that «Mom 
and Pop» stores were offering in the past. Tailors and 
seamstresses are being threatened by the ready-made 
suit and dress. Frozen foods, down to and including 
frozen vegetables, have made their cold and calcu­
lating entry into the market. The Greek self-service 
managers, however, wishing not to lose their tradi­
tional souls altogether, are freezing their plastic- 
packaged fish with head, gills, fish-eyes, and all. 
Apartment buildings are relentlessly eating away into 
the retreating ranks of private homes and their garden 
plots.
Television is doing its best to cut into an otherwise 
lovely system of social interaction. Greece—before 
TV and even still today—probably has the highest 
number of chairs per capita in the world. Most of 
these chairs are arrayed on sidewalks, parks, or near 
the seashore, and they accommodate people who 
enjoy watching other people—as a fine form of 
amusement—while sipping coffee, or enjoying a fine
pastry or ice cream, eating a hearty meal and listening 
to the social blend of voices of a crowd of strollers 
where young people, older people, and children are 
thoroughly well integrated. The Greeks today are 
fighting a valiant battle against the socially decentra­
lizing effects of TV. For instance, they prefer to watch 
an important soccer game at the local patisserie 
(thus experiencing also the crowd effect) rather than 
in the so-called peace and quiet cum loneliness of their 
living rooms. TVs in Greece have not yet won their 
battle. «Peyton Place» and «Bonanza» and various 
imitation quiz shows seem to predominate in the gene­
rally dull sequences available. Only lately, a locally 
produced TV serial called «Unknown War» and shown 
twice a week during prime time is beginning to drive 
people off the streets and into their homes. The 
government, which has complete control of all radio 
and television, is contributing unwittingly to the bat­
tle against television. All news and commentary pro­
grams are remarkably biased and one-sided. One 
hears an endless panegyric of announcers’ voices— 
cultured, exultant, melodious or high-pitched— 
praising «the accomplishments of the Revolution», 
being «thankful for the peace and quiet in Greece 
compared to places like Turkey, Italy,Ulster, Bangla 
Desh, Vietnam, and the US», recounting endless sta­
tistical figures on tourism, beds per capita, miles of 
paved road, and the like, in order to prove the ef­
fectiveness of the «revolutionary» regime. The average 
fellow responds to all this with a mixture of skep­
ticism and indifference, while the wise guys have been 
known to quip that «they [the regime] are selling us 
seaweed and passing it off as silk».
The number one national pastime seems to be 
eating at restaurants. Thousands of restaurants in 
Athens range from the «koutoukaki» (a little ro­
mantic backyard-garden establishment serving most­
ly low-priced grilled meats) to the bouzouki and gui­
tar-accompanied supper at reasonably priced ta- 
vernas, all the way up to the expansive and expensive 
tourist traps sudi as the Galaxy Room at the Hilton 
and many «cosmopolitan clubs» along the seashore. 
All these establishments are nightly packed with good- 
natured «parées» (groups of good friends) who ad­
vance eating into a multimedium art involving con­
versation, taste, humor, gossip, and—in a hushed 
tone—the inevitable political discussion.
What has impressed me about most restaurants, 
koutoukia, and cafes is the «honor system» being 
used. The waiter does not keep track of what he 
serves. The customer before departing recounts what 
the «table» consumed and the waiter presents the bill. 
This runs contrary to the conventional wisdom— 
usually manufactured by «quack sociologists» local­
ly and especially abroad—to the effect that the Greeks 
are profoundly suspicious of one another, ungovern­
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able, immature, selfish, and uncooperative. One does 
not have such thoughts walking down narrow Athens 
streets in the small dark hours of the morning, fearing 
nothing violent from his fellow man (in the form of 
muggings, sexual attacks, or existential acts of ac­
cumulated boredom and social weightlessness).
In this kind of «social paradise»·—which, I must 
repeat, is not a function of Greece’s present political 
system—the Greeks are living in a «political hell». 
When I asked a prominent Center Union politician to 
classify the present Greek system as either totalita­
rian or authoritarian, his answer was «Orwellian». 
There can be nothing but a corruptive influence 
exerted upon the Greek people by a regime which re­
lies on martial law, surveillance, and informers, and 
which cultivates one-mindedness rather than skepti­
cism, dialogue, counter-criticism, and competitive­
ness. All one needs to do to be co-opted in a position 
of some formal responsibility is to accept «the neces­
sity of the revolution, to proclaim its current virtues, 
and to dedicate himself to its regenerative task». 
Despite the myth of the «profound corruptiveness» 
of the Greek political elites, with the possible excep­
tion of the «Ivy Leaguers» (mentioned above), very 
few Greek politicians have sought to rationalize away 
or compromise their democratic principles by joining 
the regime.
So we have a situation today where no Greek, in­
cluding the Prime Minister/Regent, appears to be in 
favor of the status quo. Papadopoulos, for instance, 
will emphatically assure his listeners (in private ses­
sions) that he is working day and night for the deve­
lopment of «genuine democracy»—implying (a) that 
such a perfect system is possible, and (b) that it never 
existed in Greece.
In the meantime, Greece is ruled by «interim dicta­
torship». The universities are controlled, the press 
is self-censored by a Draconian press law which is 
tantamount to outlawing criticism (if the latter were 
to arouse old political passions or cultivate a climate 
of insecurity).
Greeks have traditionally looked to their govern­
ment for their satisfaction in a number of social servi­
ce demands. Education is public. Medical services 
are available for the working and the needy. Hunting 
licenses, business licenses, permission to build, to 
teach, or to travel are all subject to some bureaucra­
tic service. The fear, therefore, is acute that once a 
man becomes a «political leper» he and his family will 
find themselves as «social and economic lepers». 
Being out of work, unable to secure a passport or a 
new job because of political reasons, is not an envious 
condition to be in.
So the Greeks, as a rule—and especially those who 
have something to lose (and few don’t)·—compromise 
with the status quo. Privately, they hate it and criti­
cize it, and they pin their dimming hopes on the 
United States, wishing that the US will some day find 
the dictators superfluous or an unacceptable embar­
rassment, and will replace them with a more accepta­
ble form of government.
There are some Greeks—-still in the minority-—who 
seem to think that the US does not have such over­
whelming power over the regime, which by now has 
become very well entrenched: a garrison state. And 
so time passes, and soon the Greeks will be looking 
for the number «6» to commemorate the «golden 
pages» of contemporary Greek history.
The dilemmas are many for young and old alike. 
Young men—ambitious and willing to serve their 
country—have to hesitate before assuming public 
office for fear of being thought of as «collaborators» 
of the Regime. Older men and young alike are con­
stantly (probably) involved in speculation as to their 
proper stance vis-à-vis the regime. Is their silence and 
seeming indifference and resignation to be consi­
dered as passive approval of the regime? Is violent 
resistance feasible against a regime that has geome­
trically increased its expenditures for armed and se­
curity services, especially if the American colossus 
appears to be backing it? Shouldn’t Greeks, like 
Czechs and Hungarians, accept their dependent sta­
tus rather than pay the incalculable costs that the 
Vietnamese are paying in their struggle? And the 
Greeks, like the Czechs, are 'figuratively spreaking’ 
a bourgeoisified, middle-aged population, definitely 
not ripe for the «nothing-to-lose» revolutionary atti­
tude.
The chances are that the supporters of violent re­
sistance will not find much response in Greece, al­
though their acts, when occasionally committed, are 
not condemned in the public mind but are considered 
as a form of violent political articulation in a country 
where peaceful but critical political articulation is 
stifled. On the other hand, the likelihood of low-key 
but continuous passive resistance of all forms is high. 
The critical newspapers Verna, Nea, and Vradyni are 
outselling the pro-regime newspapers decisively. Cri­
ticism is inching up, testing out the reflexes of the 
Draconian press law. Political conversations—quite 
often critical of the regime—are much more apparent, 
and the police appear to pretend not to listen. Theater 
is providing plays where symbolically the regime is 
castigated to the delirious delight of the «lights-out» 
protective anonymity of the crowd.
Housewives are complaining about creeping infla­
tion (especially in the price of meat, and especially in 
the black market price of meat). Others fear that the 
US facilities for homeporting about nine ships of the 
Sixth Fleet and their families are going to act as a 
nuclear magnet in the eventuality of a nuclear war. 
Others fear that the beautiful waters of the Saronic
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Gulf will become polluted by the oil streaks and garb­
age of the Fleet. Still others complain about the effect 
on the morals (especially through drugs) of the local 
population resulting from the new American cultural 
transplants in the middle of Athens.
As for the regime, it is going on governing. Showing 
few external signs of fatigue and having power pro­
gressively concentrated in the person of Georgios 
Papadopoulos, it is now trying to convince the people 
that the present apolitical (Portugalized) system of 
governance is not, after all, so bad, and that they 
should grow accustomed to it. Energies of the youth 
should be sublimated, to please the regime, in pur­
suits other than political, such as athletics, music, 
love, and—above all—the art of moneymaking.
As many «non-political» friends of mine told me 
in Athens, «We may have political dictatorship in 
Greece, but we have economic democracy—if not 
anarchy. We may not have the freedom to vote, but 
we have the freedom and the opportunity to make mo­
ney». And that is what the regime is apparently in­
terested in cultivating: economic, rather than politi­
cal men, who leave the act of refereeing to a small 
group of army-backed leaders, who quite often would 
prefer the facelessness of the technocrat to the glit­
tering lights of a popular politician.
«When will you have elections? When will you ap­
ply your own constitution?» I asked a functionary of 
the present government. He looked at me and he 
said: «When the 20-year-old Lambrakides (Leftist 
Youth Movement operating prior to 1967) become 30 
years old, get jobs, and become heads of families. 
Then, they will have enough stake in the society not 
to take off on anarchic stunts. Then, we will be ready 
for elections». Thinking that this already placed elec­
tions around 1977-78, I asked: «What about the next 
generation of 20-year-olds coming up?» «Oh», he 
said, «We are not worried about them, because they 
are growing up under the 'proper5 education». Is this 
really the case? Will the next generation of young 
Greek men be non-political, economic men, un­
concerned about normal democratic rights and free­
doms? This is probably the central question for 
Greeks to ask themselves today!
A Critique on Th. Couloumbis’ Article
by JAMES BROWN, Assistant Professor of Political Science
Rather than specifically challenge Professor Cou­
loumbis5 comments in his article. I would prefer to 
direct my comments to the fundamental problems 
that have plagued Greece since her independence, 
problems that Professor Couloumbis has neglected 
to consider. Any criticisms attempted by anyone 
regarding this government or its predecessors must 
inevitable come to grips with the issues that under­
gird its socio-economic and political arenas. It is 
relatively easy to find fault with the current govern­
ment and its accomplishments, or any government, 
for that matter. Indeed, criticism is a simple process 
for those looking on; but the implementation and 
reconstructing of a society is extremely difficult 
and complex, especially in developing countries 
such as Greece, that do not have settled or estab­
lished structures and institutions.
Space limits us for a detailed examination of 
Greece’s socio-economic and political structures, 
but let me attempt to put into proper perspective 
the April 21st coup. I chastise Couloumbis for 
failing to consider the following factors as crucial 
variables in the events that followed the coup.
1. As Couloumbis is well aware, the big powers
imposed a parliamentary form of government on 
Greece in the 19th century at the time of her inde­
pendence. But possessing a parliamentary govern­
ment and actually utilizing viable functioning par­
liamentary institutions and their accompanying ac­
coutrements are two separate questions that would 
require further independent study. I submit that 
Greece has never possessed nor developed indige­
nous parliamentary institutions; therefore, par­
liamentary government has never been able to 
function in Greece as we in the West have envisioned 
that it should.
2. Parliamentary government in 20th century 
Greece has been the exception rather than the rule. 
By this is meant military intervention has been near­
ly constant, either direct, including numerous coups 
or attempted coups, or indirect, through the exertion 
of influence on politicians or the Crown. During the 
first quarter of this century Greek society, its poli­
ticians and its military were divided basically be­
tween two groups: the Yenezelists and the Roy­
alists. These two schisms were instigators, respect­
ively, of several coups. Mr. Couloumbis fails to 
mention that until this very day martial values have
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always been exalted in Greece; this is known as the 
leventes-palikari syndrome. I would also question 
Couloumbis’ thesis that many of the Greek politi­
cians are committed to democratic government, its 
institutions and functions. Many of the parliamenta­
ry personages who have figured prominently in 
contemporary Greek politics were, by and large, 
products of the traditional party system based on 
the patron-client relationships. This implies that 
consistent party identification and loyalty is lacking, 
and that parties and alliances are formed and re­
formed strictly to advance particular individual 
careers. Furthermore, many of the politicians that 
Couloumbis would restore in a new parliamentary 
government are the self-same people who plotted 
to implement their own coup d’etat in the first half 
of 1967 (January to mid-April). Their inability to 
organize was offset by the efficiency of George Pa­
padopoulos and his cohorts to organize and imple­
ment the Greek contingency plan, and it was this 
fact that brought the April 21st coup to the fore. 
The main point here is that Greek politicians are not 
and never have been committed to democratic prin­
ciples in the manner that Western nations consider 
fundamental for holding elected office. By the same 
token, the Greek military officer corps does not 
possess the degree of professionalism that Samuel 
Huntington (The Soldier and the State, 1964) con­
tends is so fundamental to the officer corps of West­
ern armed forces.
3. Another point that is overlooked by Cou­
loumbis is the existing chaotic societal conditions 
in Greece during 1965-1967, in particular the strikes 
and political demonstrations. If one examines the 
Gallup «End of the Year Surveys of Greece» for 
this period one will find that the Greek populace 
was most concerned about rising unemployment, 
inflation, strikes and industrial disputes, and eco­
nomic troubles. Overall, the citizenry was quite pes­
simistic about the future. These concerns have, for 
the most part, been largely eliminated since 1967. 
In fact, the Greek economy has expanded by 8% an­
nually since 1967. Coupled with these problems, the 
activities of the Left and such organizations as the 
Lambrakists in fomenting strikes and demonstra­
tions were enough to alarm many sectors of Greek 
society, as well as the officer corps. The Greek Civil 
War left many deep scars on Greeks, scars which 
are very difficult to analyze but which are contrib­
uting factors to the April, 1967 coup, as well as to 
other subsequent events.
In essence, my argument with Mr. Couloumbis 
is his failure to take into consideration the founda­
tions of Greek institutions and weigh them careful­
ly when putting the accomplishments of this or any 
government into proper perspective. This writer is 
convinced that George Papadopoulos is a hard 
working man who would no doubt like to achieve 
many of the goals he has set forth. I do agree with 
Professor Couloumbis that it is unfortunate that 
the Constitution of 1968 has not been implemented 
and that free elections have not been held. But the 
desires of Professor Couloumbis and myself, as well 
as a great many other people, do not mitigate the 
fact that the actions of the politicians on the Greek 
scene, during the two years preceding 1967, have 
drained the democratic parliamentary system of 
what vitality it may have had.
Thus, in the end the politicians and their 
supporters must bear a great share of the re­
sponsibility for what exists today in Greece and 
for what George Papadopoulos is attempting to 
do. Democracy and its accompanying institu­
tions require a grave obligation that is all 
too easily discussed but is exceedingly difficult to 
implement.
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